Capital Punishment and the Morality of Human Rights by Michael J. Perry
Journal of Catholic Legal Studies 
Volume 44 
Number 1 Volume 44, 2005, Number 1 Article 4 
April 2016 
Capital Punishment and the Morality of Human Rights 
Michael J. Perry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcls 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael J. Perry (2005) "Capital Punishment and the Morality of Human Rights," Journal of Catholic Legal 
Studies: Vol. 44 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcls/vol44/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Catholic Legal Studies by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ARTICLES
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
MORALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTSt
MICHAEL J. PERRY:
INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the countless grotesque inhumanities of the
twentieth century, there is a heartening story, amply recounted
elsewhere: the emergence, in international law, of the morality
of human rights.' The morality of human rights is not new; in
one or another version, the morality is very old. 2  But the
t © 2005, Michael J. Perry. This essay, which was the basis of a lecture I gave at
St. John's University School of Law on Oct. 13, 2004, is part of a larger work in
progress, tentatively titled "Human Rights as Morality, Human Rights as Law." I
am grateful to the audience at St. John's for the opportunity to discuss this essay
with them. I am indebted to Bill Collinge, Chris Eberle, Jeffrie Murphy, Doug
Palmer, Errol Rohr, Steve Smith, Heidi Tauscher, Michael Sullivan, George Wright,
and Ron Wright for greatly helpful comments, and to John O'Callaghan, of the
Notre Dame Philosophy Department, for e-mail discussion of the traditional
Catholic position on the morality of capital punishment. I am also grateful to those
who participated in two faculty workshops: at Emory Law School on May 26, 2004
and at Arizona State University College of Law on February 4, 2005.
t Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory University; Senior Fellow, Law
and Religion Program, Emory University.
I See, e.g., ROBERT F. DRINAN, CRY OF THE OPPRESSED: THE HISTORY AND HOPE
OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1987); Louis B. Sohn, The New International
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(1982).
2 See LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MODERNITY ON ENDLESS TRIAL 214 (1990).
It is often stressed that the idea of human rights is of recent origin, and
that this is enough to dismiss its claims to timeless validity. In its
contemporary form, the doctrine is certainly new, though it is arguable
that it is a modern version of the natural law theory, whose origins we can
trace back at least to the Stoic philosophers and, of course, to the Judaic
and Christian sources of European culture. There is no substantial
difference between proclaiming "the right to life" and stating that natural
law forbids killing. Much as the concept may have been elaborated in the
philosophy of the Enlightenment in its conflict with Christianity, the
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emergence of the morality in international law, in the period
since the end of World War II, is a profoundly important
development-a development that makes the moral landscape of
the twentieth century a touch less bleak. Although it is only one
morality among many, the morality of human rights has become
the dominant morality of our time. Indeed, unlike any morality
before it, the morality of human rights has become a global
morality; human-rights-talk has become the moral lingua
franca.3 Nonetheless, neither the morality of human rights nor
its relationship to the law of human rights is well understood. 4
As it has emerged in international law, what does the
morality of human rights hold? The International Bill of Rights,
as it is informally known, consists of three documents: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR").5 The Universal Declaration refers, in its preamble,
notion of the immutable rights of individuals goes back to the Christian
belief in the autonomous status and irreplaceable value of the human
personality.
Id.
3 As Juirgen Habermas has recently noted: "Notwithstanding their European
origins ..... [iun Asia, Africa, and South America, [human rights now] constitute
the only language in which the opponents and victims of murderous regimes and
civil wars can raise their voices against violence, repression, and persecution,
against injuries to their human dignity." JURGEN HABERMAS, RELIGION AND
RATIONALITY: ESSAYS ON REASON, GOD, AND MODERNITY 153 (Eduardo Mendieta
ed., 2002).
4 For a brief overview of the subject of human rights, see James Nickel, Human
Rights, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2003), at http://plato.stanford.
edulentries/rights-human. For a more.extended discussion, see JAMES W. NICKEL,
MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2004). For historical context, see Kenneth
Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 AM. HIST. REV. 117 (2004).
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., at
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The Universal
Declaration was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on Dec. 10, 1948. The ICCPR and the ICESCR, which are treaties and as
such are binding on the several state parties thereto, were meant, in part, to
elaborate the various rights specified in the Universal Declaration. The ICCPR and
the ICESCR were each adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on Dec. 16, 1966. The ICESCR
entered into force on Jan. 3, 1976, and as of June 2004, has 149 state parties. The
ICCPR entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976, and as of June 2004, has 152 state
parties. In October 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed both the ICCPR and the
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to "the inherent dignity.., of all members of the human family"6
and states, in Article 1, that "[a]ll human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights ... and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood."7 The two Covenants each
refer, in their preambles, to "the inherent dignity.., of all
members of the human family"8 and to "the inherent dignity of
the human person"-from which, the covenants insist, "the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family... derive."9  As the International Bill of Rights makes
clear, then, the fundamental conviction at the heart of the
morality of human rights is this: each and every (born) human
being-each and every member of the species homo sapiens-has
inherent dignity; 10 therefore, no one should deny that any
human being has, or treat any human being as if she lacks,
inherent dignity."
ICESCR. Although the United States Senate has not ratified the ICESCR, in
September 1992, with the support of President George H. W. Bush, the Senate
ratified the ICCPR. The Senate ratified the ICCPR subject to certain "reservations,
understandings [and] declarations" that are not relevant here. See 138 CONG. REC.
S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell). So the United States is a
party to the ICCPR but not to the ICESCR.
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 5, pmbl. at 71.
7 Id. art. 1 at 72.
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, pmbl. at
49; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights, supra note 5,
pmbl. at 52-53.
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, pmbl. at
52-53; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights, supra note
5, pmbl. at 49. The relevant wording of the two preambles is as follows:
The State Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that.., recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person,
Agree upon the following articles: ....
Id.; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7,
pmbl. at 52-53.
10 Cf. IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS FOR OUR TIMES (Robert P.
Kraynak & Glenn Tinder eds., 2003); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and
Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L.
REV. 15, 15, 25 (2004).
11 The morality of human rights holds not that every human being has inherent
dignity, but only that every born human being has inherent dignity. I comment on
this state of affairs elsewhere in the work of which this essay is a part, in the course
of discussing abortion from the perspective of the morality of human rights. Because
abortion is not an issue in this essay, I will bracket the born/unborn distinction and
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To say that every human being has inherent dignity is to say
that one's dignity inheres in nothing more particular than one's
being a human being; 12 it does not inhere, for example, in one's
"race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status."13
According to the morality of human rights, because every human
being has inherent dignity, no one should deny that any human
being has, or treat any human being as if she lacks, inherent
dignity. The conviction that every human being has inherent
dignity-and that therefore no one should deny that any human
being has, or treat any human being as if she lacks, inherent
dignity-is so fundamental to the morality of human rights that
when I say, in this Article, "the morality of human rights," I am
referring, unless the context indicates otherwise, to this
conviction. For the sake of simplicity, I will say that an action or
policy "violates" a human being if the rationale for the
action/policy denies that the human being has, or treats her as if
she lacks, inherent dignity.
The morality of human rights is one thing, the law of human
rights, another. What is the relationship of the former to the
latter? How do we get from the morality of human rights to the
law (international, transnational, and national) of human rights?
What rights-that is, what rights-claims, claims about what one
may not do to someone or about what one must do for someone-
should we who affirm the morality of human rights, because we
affirm it, want the law to protect (and seek to have it protect if it
doesn't already)?
say simply that according to the morality of human rights, every human being has
inherent dignity.
12 Cf. CHARLES E. CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 1891-PRESENT: A
HISTORICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS 132 (2002).
Human dignity comes from God's free gift; it does not depend on human
effort, work, or accomplishments. All human beings have a fundamental,
equal dignity because all share the generous gift of creation and
redemption from God. ... Consequently, all human beings have the same
fundamental dignity, whether they are brown, black, red, or white; rich or
poor, young or old; male or female; healthy or sick.
Id.
13 The ICCPR, in Article 26, bans "discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 5, art. 26, at 56.
[Vol.44:1
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We who affirm the morality of human rights, because we
affirm it, should do (i.e., we have good reason to do) what we can,
all things considered, to prevent government from violating
human beings. That is, we should do what we reasonably can to
prevent government from taking actions or pursuing policies
that deny that one or more human beings have, or treat them as
if they lack, inherent dignity. ("Loosely specified obligations
must not be confused with no obligations at all.") 14 One of the
things that we in liberal democracies can do, that we are
politically free to do, to prevent governments-our own
government as well as other governments-from violating
human beings is support laws that forbid, or if enacted would
forbid, governments to take actions or pursue policies that
violate one or more human beings. This is surely not the only
thing we can do,15 but it is one of the most important things we
can do. 16
It would be a mistake, however, to think that we who affirm
the morality of human rights should want the law to ban only
actions/policies that violate (i.e., whose rationales violate) one or
more human beings. We should also want the law to ban
actions/policies that, even if they (their rationales) do not violate
any human being-even if they neither deny that any human
being has inherent dignity nor treat any human being as if she
lacks it-are nonetheless a source of unwarranted human
suffering or other harm.1 7 I am referring here to significant
human suffering (or other harm), not trivial human suffering.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer observed that "[w]e have for once learnt to
14 Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
315, 341 (2004).
15 See id. at 327-28.
16 When I say that a government action/policy violates a human being, I mean
that the rationale for the action/policy violates a human being; that is, the rationale
either denies that one or more human beings have inherent dignity or treats them
as if they lack it. What the Nazis did to Jews was embedded in an ideology
according to which Jews are pseudohuman; the Nazis denied that Jews have
whatever moral status-whatever dignity, whatever worth-true human beings
have. (According to the morality of human rights, the moral status that human
beings have is inherent dignity.) Whether or not Bosnian Serbs believed that
Bosnian Muslims were pseudohuman, Bosnian Serbs certainly treated Bosnian
Muslims as if they lacked inherent dignity. How else to understand what Bosnian
Serbs did to Bosnian Muslims-humiliation, rape, torture, murder? In that sense,
what Bosnian Serbs did to Bosnian Muslims constituted a practical denial-an
existential denial-that Bosnian Muslims have inherent dignity.
17 I develop this point elsewhere in the work of which this essay is a part.
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see the great events of world history from below, from the
perspective of the outcast, the suspects, the maltreated, the
powerless, the oppressed, the reviled-in short, from the
perspective of those who suffer."' 8 If we decline to do what we
can, all things considered, to diminish unwarranted human
suffering (or other harm)-and by "we" I mean here primarily
the collective we, as in "We the People," acting through our
elected representatives-we decline to do what we can, all things
considered, to protect those who endure that suffering. We
thereby fail to respect their inherent dignity; we violate them by
treating them as if they lack inherent dignity. Primo Levi wrote
that once we know how to alleviate torment and don't, we
become tormentors. 19  Martin Luther King, Jr. said: 'Man's
inhumanity to man is not only perpetrated by the vitriolic
actions of those who are bad. It is also perpetrated by the
vitiating inaction of those who are good."20 Sometimes it is not,
or not only, a government action/policy that violates human
beings; sometimes the violation consists in our failure to do what
we can, all things considered, to protect human beings from the
action/policy. 2'
18 See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, After Ten Years: A Letter to the Family and
Conspirators, in A TESTAMENT TO FREEDOM 510 (Geffrey B. Kelly & F. Burton
Nelson eds., 1990). Bonhoeffer continues: 'This perspective from below must not
become the partisan possession of those who are eternally dissatisfied; rather, we
must do justice to life in all its dimensions from a higher satisfaction, whose
foundation is beyond any talk of 'from below' or 'from above."' Id.
19 See Eric A. Johnson, Harm to the "Fabric of Society" as a Basis for Regulating
Otherwise Harmless Conduct: Notes on a Theme from Ravin v. State, 27 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 41, 65-66 (2003).
20 Nicholas D. Kristof, The American Witness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at A19
(quoting Martin Luther King, Jr.).
21 See id.; see also Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations on Terrorism & Anti-
Terrorism Law & Literature, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1112 (2003). What Amartya
Sen, borrowing from Immanuel Kant, calls the distinction between "perfect" and
"imperfect" duties is relevant here-though I would mark the distinction by
different terms: "determinate" and "indeterminate" duties.
[The human right to freedom from torture] includes... an affirmation of
the need for others to consider what they can reasonably do to secure the
freedom from torture for any person. For a would-be torturer, the demand
is obviously quite straightforward, to wit, to refrain and desist. The
demand takes the clear form of what Immanuel Kant called a perfect
obligation. However, for others too (that is, those other than the would-be
torturers) there are responsibilities, even though they are less specific and
come in the general form of "imperfect obligations" (to invoke another
Kantian concept). The perfectly specified demand not to torture anyone is
supplemented by the more general, and less exactly specified, requirement
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To say, in the present context, that an instance of human
suffering is "unwarranted" is to say that the action/policy that is
a source of the suffering-that is a cause of the suffering or that
fails to intervene to diminish the suffering-is not warranted,
that it is not justified. Not justified from whose perspective? It is
scarcely surprising that the action/policy, and therefore the
suffering that it causes, or fails to intervene to diminish, are
justified from the perspective of those whose action/policy is in
question. But theirs is not the relevant perspective. The
relevant perspective belongs to those of us who, in coming face to
face with the suffering, must decide what, if anything, to do, or
to try to do, about it;22 in making that decision, we must reach
our own judgment about whether the suffering is warranted.
This, then, is the relationship of the morality of human
rights to the law of human rights; this is how we get from the
morality of human rights to the law-more precisely, to what we
believe should be the law-of human rights: We who affirm the
morality of human rights, because we affirm it, should want the
law to ban actions/policies that violate any human being or that
are otherwise a source of unwarranted human suffering. We
should want the law to protect certain rights; we should support
laws-we should work to get laws on the books if they are not
to consider the ways and means through which torture can be prevented
and then to decide what one should, thus, reasonably do....
Even though recognitions of human rights (with their associated claims
and obligations) are ethical affirmations, they need not, by themselves,
deliver a complete blueprint for evaluative assessment. An agreement on
human rights does involve a firm commitment, to wit, to give reasonable
consideration to the duties that follow from that ethical endorsement. But
even with agreement on these affirmations, there can still be serious
debates, particularly in the case of imperfect obligations, on (i) the ways in
which the attention that is owed to human rights should be best paid, (ii)
how the different types of human rights should be weighed against each
other and their respective demands integrated together, (iii) how the
claims of human rights should be consolidated with other evaluative
concerns that may also deserve ethical attention, and so on. A theory of
human rights can leave room for further discussions, disputations and
arguments. The approach of open public reasoning... can definitively
settle some disputes about coverage and content (including the
identification of some clearly sustainable rights and others that would be
hard to sustain), but may have to leave others, at least tentatively,
unsettled. The admissibility of a domain of continued dispute is no
embarrassment to a theory of human rights.
Sen, supra note 14, at 321-23 (footnotes omitted).
22 See Johnson, supra note 19, at 65-66.
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already there, and to keep them there if they are-that (would)
protect certain rights (rights-claims): rights not to be subjected
to actions/policies that violate human beings or that otherwise
are a source of unwarranted human suffering.
There is no doubt that we who affirm the morality of human
rights should want the law to protect a right to life. (A right to
life, in one or another version, is widely regarded as the mother
of all human rights.)23  But which right to life? Not every
imaginable right to life has precisely the same scope. The
particular right at issue in this essay concerns capital
punishment: Should we who affirm the morality of human
rights want the law to protect human beings from-by giving
them a right to be free from-capital punishment? To ask that
question is necessarily to ask whether (and if so, why) we should
want the law to protect a particular right to life, namely, one
that bans capital punishment. 24
23 See, e.g., William P. Clark, For Reagan, All Life Was Sacred, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 2004, at A27 ("[T]here is no cause more important ... than affirming the
transcendent right to life of all human beings, the right without which no other
rights have any meaning.") (quoting Ronald Reagan); Bishop Victor Galeone, A Pro-
Choice Catholic Politician?, 34 ORIGINS 199, 200 (2004) ("[T]he right to life is the
foundation of all our other rights. Just as a building without a foundation will
ultimately collapse, so too every other right we enjoy will crumble unless buttressed
by this most basic right of all.").
24 A little context never hurts. "As of January 1, 2003, 112 countries had
abolished the death penalty in law or practice, and 83 countries retained it." E.
CHRISTIAN BRUGGER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL
TRADITION 191 n.2 (2003).
Today, all members of the European Union have banned the death penalty.
Abolition has been made a prerequisite for EU membership, giving
Eastern and Central European nations who desire to join the EU strong
incentives to prohibit the practice. In principle and in practice, Western
European governments are unequivocally opposed to capital punishment.
Kathryn F. King, The Death Penalty, Extradition, and the War against Terrorism:
U.S. Responses to European Opinion about Capital Punishment, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 161, 171 (2003).
China was responsible for nearly two-thirds of the world's known
executions last year [2003], which totaled at least 1,146 people worldwide,
Amnesty International says in a new report released yesterday at a
meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva.... China
carried out more than 726 known executions, followed by 108 in Iran, 65 in
the United States and 64 in Vietnam. These four countries accounted for
84 percent of all executions around the world.
China, Iran, U.S., Vietnam Conducted Most Executions in 2003, U.N. WIRE, April 7,
2004; cf. Eric Neumayer, The Determinants of Death Penalty Abolition in Global
Perspective (Jan. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Consider the trajectory of the international law of human
rights with respect to capital punishment. The International
Bill of Rights is the informal name for three documents,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
ICCPR. The third document-the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-is not relevant in the
context of this essay. Neither the Universal Declaration nor the
ICCPR (i.e., the ICCPR as it was adopted in 1966 and entered
into force in 1976) articulate the right at issue in this essay: the
right not to be executed. (The ICCPR does state, in Article 6,
that "[i]n countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime."25  It also states that "[s]entence of
death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on
pregnant women.") 26 In 1989, however, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Second Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, Article 1 of which provides: "1. No one within the
jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be
executed. 2. Each State Party shall take all necessary measures
to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction."27  Article 2
of the Second Optional Protocol permits a State, at the time it
ratifies or accedes to the Protocol, to reserve for itself the right to
apply "the death penalty in time of war pursuant to a conviction
for a most serious crime of a military nature committed during
wartime."28
25 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
5, art. 6, at 52.
26 Id.
27 G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(1989).
28 Id. As of January 2005, fifty-two states have ratified the Second Optional
Protocol, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. (Of the listed states, only Greece and Spain entered a
reservation under Article 2; Spain subsequently withdrew its reservation.) See
Amnesty International, Ratification of International Treaties, at http://web.amnesty.
org/pages/deathpenalty-treaties-eng (last updated Dec. 16, 2004); cf. Eric Neumayer,
Death Penalty Abolition and the Ratification of the Second Optional Protocol 3
(September 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with St. John's Law Review),
available at http://www.lse.ac.uklcollectoins/geographyandenvi
ronmentlwhoswho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/deathpenaltyarticle2.pdf).
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The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, when it entered into force in
1950, did not articulate a right not to be executed; to the
contrary, Article 2(1) of the European Convention stated that
"[n]o one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by law.'' 29  In 1982,
however, the Council of Europe adopted Protocol No. 6 to the
European Convention, Article 1 of which provides: "The death
penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be subjected to such
penalty or executed."30 Article 2 provides: "A State may make
provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts
committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war ....
Then, in 2002, the Council of Europe went even further by
adopting Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention, which
provides in relevant part:
Noting that Protocol No. 6 to the Convention.. . does not
exclude the death penalty in respect of acts committed in time
of war or of imminent threat of war;
Being resolved to take the final step in order to abolish the
death penalty in all circumstances,
Article 1 - Abolition of the death penalty
The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be
condemned to such penalty or executed.32
Should we who affirm the morality of human rights also
affirm the trajectory marked by the Second Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR and Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention?33
29 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 2, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
30 Id.
31 Id. As of December 2004, forty-four states have ratified Protocol No. 6. See
Amnesty International, supra note 28.
32 Id. As of December 2004, twenty-nine states have ratified, and fourteen other
states have signed but not yet ratified, Protocol No. 13. See Amnesty International,
supra note 28.
33 We should note, too, that the Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, adopted by the General Assembly of the
Organization of American States in 1990, provides for the total abolition of the
death penalty, but allows a state to "reserve the right to apply the death penalty in
wartime in accordance with international law, for extremely serious crimes of a
military nature," if the state makes a reservation to that effect at the time it ratifies
the Protocol. Organization of American States, Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, art. 2 (1990), available at
http://www.oas.org/juridicolenglish/Treaties/a-53.htm. The Protocol "shall enter into
[Vol.44:1
2005] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 11
That is, should we want the law, including international law, to
protect the right not to be executed? 34
There are several reasons to oppose capital punishment,
only one of which is that every human being has inherent
dignity. (As I explain below, however, to affirm that every
human being has inherent dignity is not necessarily to oppose
capital punishment.) Other reasons to oppose capital
punishment concern the way the system of capital punishment
("the machinery of death," as Supreme Court Justice Harry
Blackmun famously called it)35 functions in one's society. One
may oppose capital punishment because, for example, some
innocent persons will be executed,36 or because the poor are more
likely to be executed than the rich for the same kind of crime,37
or because those whose victims are white are more likely to be
executed than those whose victims are black. 38 But for those of
us who affirm the morality of human rights-who affirm that
every human being has inherent dignity-no question about
capital punishment is more fundamental than the question
whether we should want the law to ban capital punishment even
if we knew how to construct a perfectly functioning system of
capital punishment: a system in which no innocent person would
force among the States that ratify or accede to it when they deposit their respective
instruments of ratification or accession with the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States." Id. at art. 4. As of May 2004, there were eight
state parties to the Protocol: Brazil (which entered a reservation under Article 2),
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Chile has signed but not yet ratified the Protocol.
34 See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAs, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2002).
35 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) ("From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with
the machinery of death.").
36 See Hugo Adam Bedau et al., Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases:
Criteria, Evidence, and Inference, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 587 (2004); Lawrence C.
Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW
573, 574-75 (2004); cf. Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False
Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2004, at A15.
37 See J. Michael Echevarria, Reflections on O.J. and the Gas Chamber, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 491, 494 (1995).
38 See, e.g., HUGO ADAM BEDAU & PAUL G. CASSELL, DEBATING THE DEATH
PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? THE EXPERTS ON BOTH
SIDES MAKE THEIR BEST CASE (2003); Symposium, Race to Execution, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1403 (2004); Symposium, Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who
Deserves Death?, 24 PACE L. REV. 107 (2003).
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be executed,39 the rich would be just as likely to be executed as
the poor, those whose victims are black would be just as likely to
be executed as those whose victims are white, and so on. Is it
necessarily the case that even under a perfectly functioning
system of capital punishment, to execute a human being-any
human being-is to treat him as if he lacks inherent dignity (and
thereby to violate him)?40
To say that this is the most fundamental question about
capital punishment for those of us who affirm the morality of
human rights is not to say that it is the most important question.
In the real world, where systems of capital punishment are, and
probably always will be, far from perfectly functioning, the most
important question is whether these imperfect systems-as
distinct from some imaginary perfect systems-are morally
tolerable.
I. CAN ONE FORFEIT ONE'S INHERENT DIGNITY?
Whereas the issue of abortion leads us to think about when
human beings acquire inherent dignity, the issue of capital
punishment leads us to think about when, if ever, human beings
forfeit inherent dignity. To affirm, as some of us do, that only
some human beings have inherent dignity-namely, human
beings who have not acted in such a way that they have forfeited
their inherent dignity-is not to affirm the morality of human
rights; it is to affirm less than the morality of human rights.41
39 See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Offers Plan for Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2004, at A4.
A commission appointed by [Massachusetts] Gov. Mitt Romney has come
up with what it considers the first virtually foolproof formula for [insuring
that no innocent person is executed], and Mr. Romney is expected to use
the plan to try to bring back capital punishment to the state, where it was
abolished two decades ago.
Id.
40 I assume-I'm sure we all assume-that it is not morally problematic to
punish convicted criminals (some more severely than others, depending mainly on
the gravity of the crime and/or the culpability of the criminal), and that it would not
be morally problematic to punish them even if there were no deterrent effect. This
does not mean, however, that we may punish convicted criminals in any way we
choose. Five years for stealing a loaf of bread crosses the line. Torture crosses the
line (i.e., torture as criminal punishment, not as a way of getting information that
will enable us to save lives). This essay addresses the question whether capital
punishment crosses the line. The issue is not whether we are justified in punishing
criminals, but whether we are justified in punishing them by killing them.
41 See supra note 12.
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Now, even one who believes that human beings can forfeit their
inherent dignity by acting in a sufficiently depraved way-
indeed, even one who denies that there is such a thing as
inherent dignity-can oppose capital punishment, because, as I
noted in the preceding paragraph, there are multiple reasons to
oppose capital punishment, only one of which is that every
human-born being (i.e., at least every born human being) has
inherent dignity. Still, one who believes that every human being
has inherent dignity has an additional, and fundamental, reason
to want the law to ban capital punishment (though, again, to
believe that every human being has inherent dignity is not
necessarily to oppose capital punishment). Before I develop the
point, however, I want to consider whether it makes sense to
think that human beings, by acting in a sufficiently depraved
way, can forfeit--can alienate themselves from-their inherent
dignity.
This question brings us back to an issue I have addressed
elsewhere. 42 What is the ground of the inherent dignity of every
human being; why-in virtue of what-does a human being have
inherent dignity? Although the International Bill of Rights is
silent about the ground of inherent dignity, the Bill says nothing
to suggest that our inherent dignity depends on anything we
have done or have failed to do. What some of us believe about
the ground of inherent dignity leaves no room for the possibility
that human beings can forfeit their inherent dignity: We believe
that human beings have inherent dignity not because of
anything we have done or have failed to do, but because of who
we are, namely, beloved children of God and sisters/brothers to
one another; moreover, God's love for us does not depend on
whether or not we have acted in a depraved way.43
Bear in mind that one who acts in a depraved way may well
be one who, from an early age, has had his humanity beaten out
of him and his depravity beaten into him. Do we really want to
say, in effect, that one can have one's inherent dignity beaten out
of him? 44 And even if one could forfeit one's inherent dignity by
42 See Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious
Ground?, 54 EMORY L.J. 97 (2005).
43 See supra note 12.
44 My friend and former colleague Ron Wright, an acclaimed expert in criminal
justice, wrote in an e-mail message that this
[P]aragraph begins with a red herring-yes, there are people whose
nightmarish childhood explains their nightmarish crimes as adults. But
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acting in a sufficiently depraved way, presumably one could get
it back by acting in a sufficiently repentant way. Even a
depraved criminal can be "born again"; indeed, even a depraved
criminal can become a saint. So why think that the premise that
one can forfeit one's inherent dignity supports the case for
capital punishment? "As I live-declares the Lord Yahweh-I do
not take pleasure in the death of the wicked but in the
conversion of the wicked who changes his ways and saves his
life."45
During the papacy of John Paul II, the Roman Catholic
Church became one of the most insistent and influential voices
those cases are tougher for prosecutors to win. The measured proponent of
capital punishment would say that a perfectly operating system should
reserve the death penalty only for those who demonstrate depravity by
committing a crime that was not compelled in some sense by their
upbringing. There are plenty of examples.
E-mail from Ronald Wright, to Michael Perry (July 14, 2004) (on file with author).
45 Ezekiel 33:11 (New American). Jeffrie Murphy writes:
In a letter to Marcellinus, the special delegate of the Emperor Honorius to
settle the dispute between Catholics and Donatists, Augustine is concerned
with the punishment to be administered for what must have, to him,
seemed the most vicious of crimes: the murder of one Catholic priest and
the mutilation of another by members of a radical Donatist faction.
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 109 (2003).
Murphy then quotes from Augustine's letter:
I have been a prey to the deepest anxiety for fear your Highness might
perhaps decree that they be sentenced to the utmost penalty of the law, by
suffering a punishment in proportion to their deeds. Therefore, in this
letter, I beg you by the faith which you have in Christ and by the mercy of
the same Lord Christ, not to do this, not to let it be done under any
circumstances. For although we [bishops] can refuse to be held responsible
for the death of men who were not manifestly presented for trial on charge
of ours, but on the indictment of officers whose duty it is to safeguard the
public peace, we yet do not wish that the martyrdom of the servants of God
should be avenged by similar suffering, as if by way of retaliation.... We
do not object to wicked men being deprived of their freedom to do wrong,
but we wish it to go just that far, so that, without losing their life or being
maimed in any part of their body, they may be restrained by the law from
their mad frenzy, guided into the way of peace and sanity, and assigned to
some useful work to replace their criminal activities. It is true, this is
called a penalty, but who can fail to see that it should be called a benefit
rather than a chastisement when violence and cruelty are held in check,
but the remedy of repentance is not withheld?
Id. at 110; cf. Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in ALBERT CAMUS,
RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 230 (Justin O'Brien trans., Vintage Books
1974) ("We know enough to say that this or that major criminal deserves hard labor
for life. But we don't know enough to decree that he be shorn of his future-in other
words, of the chance we all have of making amends.").
2005] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 15
in support of the abolition of capital punishment.46 Yet, until
relatively recently, the Church taught that one can forfeit one's
inherent dignity. As E. Christian Brugger notes:
Though the Catholic tradition has always affirmed the absolute
immunity of innocent human life from intentional attacks and
destruction, moral culpability for gravely wrong acts has
traditionally been understood to forfeit that status. The
tradition is quite clear that the lives of those who deliberately
commit serious crimes are not inviolable .... [Thomas]
Aquinas says that a grave sinner "falls" from human dignity
and may be treated as a beast, Pius XII that a dangerous
criminal, "by his crime .... has already disposed himself of his
right to live." In both cases, the life of the malefactor through
the malefactor's own deliberate act(s) becomes violable. 47
Brugger then goes on to explain that "[t]his is not the teaching of
the [1997] Catechism [of the Catholic Church] or of [the pope's
1995 encyclical] Evangelium Vitae. In fact, John Paul II
emphatically states in the latter that 'Not even a murderer loses
his personal dignity' (no. 9)."48 The Church's new position is that
we human beings cannot forfeit our inherent dignity, because
God's love for us-which is the fundamental ground of our
inherent dignity-is unceasing. The Administrative Committee
of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops recently
declared "each person's life and dignity must be respected,
whether that person is an innocent unborn child in a mother's
womb.., or even whether that person is a convicted criminal on
death row."49 There is nothing distinctively Roman Catholic-or
even Christian-about this position. 50
46 See infra note 49.
47 BRUGGER, supra note 24, at 26 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
Brugger quotes this passage from Aquinas:
By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and therefore falls away
from human dignity, insofar as man is naturally free and exists for his own
sake, and falls somehow into the slavery of the beasts, so that he may be
disposed of according to what is useful to others.... Therefore, although it
be evil in itself to kill a man who preserves his human dignity,
nevertheless to kill a man who is a sinner can be good, just as it can be
good to kill a beast....
Id. at 173 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
48 Id. at 26-27.
49 U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Admin. Comm., Faithful Citizenship: A
Catholic Call to Political Responsibility, 33 ORIGINS 321, 325 (Oct. 23, 2003).
50 According to Michael Lerner, editor of Tikkun, Sarah's existential
orientation-her love for the Other-is as Jewish as it is Christian:
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In any event, the morality of human rights holds that each
and every (born) human being has inherent dignity. There is no
exception for depraved criminals. From the perspective of the
morality of human rights, then, the question is not whether, as
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan insisted, "even
the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common
human dignity."51 The question, rather, is whether executing a
human being under a system, even a perfectly functioning
system, of capital punishment necessarily treats him as if he
lacks inherent dignity and thereby violates him? 52 And if the
answer is "No, not necessarily," a further question arises:
Should we who affirm that every human being has inherent
dignity nonetheless want the law to protect the right of every
human being not to be executed?
II. INHERENT DIGNITY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
"UNCONDITIONALIST" PRINCIPLE 53
The Catholic Church now teaches that every human being,
innocent or not, has inherent dignity-a dignity that cannot be
forfeited and is therefore inalienable; and John Paul II taught
that to execute a human being is to fail to respect "the
inalienable dignity of human life"; it is to treat him as if he lacks
Jesus' message of love is ... an intrinsic part of Torah Judaism .... It was
the Torah, not Jesus, that first taught "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself' and 'Thou shalt love the Lord your God with all your heart, with
all your soul, and with all your might." It was this same Judaism that
taught a truly revolutionary message: "Thou shalt love the stranger
(Hebrew: ger, which might also be translated as "The Other" or "the
Powerless one," based on the follow-up point made in Torah, "Remember
that you were a Ger in Egypt" when the Jewish people were enslaved).
Michael Lerner, Jesus the Jew, 19 TIKKUN, May/June 2004, at 33; cf. RAIMOND
GAITA, A COMMON HUMANITY: THINKING ABOUT LOVE AND TRUTH AND JUSTICE
xviii-xix (2000) ("[T]he language of love ... compels us to affirm that even.., the
most radical evil-doers ... are fully our fellow human beings.").
51 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 230 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972)).
52 Three of seven judges on the Canadian Supreme Court stated in a case that
the death penalty "is the supreme indignity to the individual, the ultimate corporal
punishment, the final and complete lobotomy and the absolute and irrevocable
castration. [It is] the ultimate desecration of human dignity." Kindler v. Canada,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 818.
53 For a magisterial history of western-in particular, Christian-thinking
about capital punishment, see JAMES J. MEGIVERN, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN
HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL SURVEY (1997).
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inherent dignity.54 But is executing a human being necessarily
to treat him as if he lacks inherent dignity?
As E. Christian Brugger explains in his recent, important
book, Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral
Tradition,55 the Church has long taught that it is morally
permissible to choose to do something in order to achieve a good
end even if one foresees that one's choice may or even will have
the effect of killing a human being, so long as one does not intend
one's choice to have that effect. 56  However, the Church's
teaching contains this important proviso:
54 Pope John Paul II, Declaration of the Holy See to the First World Congress on
the Death Penalty, June 21, 2001, at http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/secretariat
_state/documents/rc-seg-stdoc_2001062 1_death-penalty-en.html; see also
MEGIVERN, supra note 53, at 444-46.
In his Urbi et Orbi address in December 1998, Pope John Paul II said: 'MIay
Christmas help to strengthen and renew, throughout the world, the consensus
concerning the need for urgent and adequate measures ... to end the death
penalty." Pope John Paul II, Illuminating Present World Problems with Bethlehem's
Light, 28 ORIGINS 505, 506 (1999). In January 1999, during a trip to St. Louis, he
appealed to Governor Mel Carnahan of Missouri to commute the death sentence of
Darrell Mease to life without parole. On January 28, the governor announced he
had done what the pope had asked. In the pope's homily at the St. Louis World
Dome several days later he said: "I renew the appeal I made most recently at
Christmas for a consensus to end the death penalty, which is both cruel and
unnecessary." Pope John Paul II, Homily in the Trans World Dome, 28 ORIGINS 599,
601 (1999). At an international congress on the death penalty in June 2001, the
Holy See stated that it "has consistently sought the abolition of the death penalty
and his Holiness John Paul II has personally and indiscriminately appealed on
numerous occasions in order that such sentences should be commuted to a lesser
punishment." It added, "[i]t is surely more necessary than ever that the inalienable
dignity of human life be universally respected and recognized for its immeasurable
value." Zenit News Agency, The Shifting Sands of Capital Punishment: High Profile
Cases in Islamic Countries; Changes in U.S., Jan. 19, 2002, at http://www.zenit.org/
englishlvisualizza.phtml?sid=15359; see also Alessandra Stanley, Pope, in St. Louis
Mass, Urges U.S. Catholics to Oppose Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1999, at
A16.
Preaching consistency in moral values, Pope John Paul II today urged
America's Roman Catholics to extend the crusade to protect human life to
include murderers on death row. "The new evangelization calls for
followers of Christ who are unconditionally pro-life," the Pope preached to
100,000 people [in St. Louis]. 'Modern society has the means of protecting
itself, without definitively denying criminals the chance to reform." He
called the death penalty, "cruel and unnecessary," and said it was so "even
in the case of someone who has done great evil."
Id.
55 BRUGGER, supra note 24. Brugger wrote his book under the supervision of
John Finnis and Oliver O'Donovan. Id. at 5.
56 Brugger explains:
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The fact that the effect ... is unintended ... does not by itself
guarantee a morally good act.... [Olne's acceptance of side
effects is subject to another moral principle, namely, the
principle of proportionality: an unintended lethal act of self-
defense is still wrong 'if it is not proportionate to its end' (i.e., if
more violence than necessary is used to bring about the good
end of rendering the aggressor incapable of committing harm.57
For example, one may choose to fire a gun at someone who is
unjustly attacking one's life, or someone else's life, even though
one foresees that this choice may well result not merely in
disabling the attacker but in killing him. (The attacker may or
may not be morally blameworthy; e.g., he may be psychotic.)
The important thing, for the Church, is that in firing one's gun,
one intends only to disable the attacker, not to kill him.
The Church has long taught that it is always morally
forbidden to kill an innocent human being intentionally. 58 Why
did John Paul II seem to go further and teach that it is always
morally forbidden to kill any human being, innocent or not,
intentionally? 59 Brugger has explained that to kill someone
What is the morally relevant basis for distinguishing between what one
intends and what one merely foresees?... Intention is an act of the will
whereby some good or apparent good is chosen in response to reason
moving it to act. Since the will is a rational appetite, what one intends is
what one desires, or what one endeavors to have, be, or bring about; we
might say it is what one sets one's heart upon, what one seeks to possess,
or rest in. A foreseen effect that lies outside one's intention is not absent
from one's deliberations, but is not what one directly commits oneself to
when acting; it is not for that effect's sake that one chooses to act. The two
effects stand in a different relationship to the will of the actor. To be sure,
in foreseeing such a state of affairs resulting from one's freely chosen
action, one is willing to do an act which brings about those states of affairs.
In intending action x with consequence y, I consent to bring about y (i.e., I
choose a y-bringing-about action). But I have no commitment to y, no
morally relevant interest in bringing about y, and no morally relevant
desire to see y happen.
Id. at 184-85 (footnotes omitted).
57 Id. at 185 (footnote omitted).
58 Cristina L.H. Traina, Religious Perspectives on Assisted Suicide, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1147, 1148-49 (1998).
59 According to Brugger, this teaching is now the emergent position of the
magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church, although the 1997 Catechism of the
Catholic Church does not state this teaching. See generally BRUGGER, supra note 24,
at 9-37; see also E. Christian Brugger, Avery Cardinal Dulles and His Critics: An
Exchange on Capital Punishment, 115 FIRST THINGS 7, 7-8 (August/September
2001).
The new framework [of the 1997 Catechism of the Catholic Church] is
laying a theoretical foundation for a change (not "development" precisely
[Vol.44:1
20051 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1
intentionally is necessarily to want to kill him6° (though it is not
necessarily to want to be in the situation in which one feels
constrained to want to kill him), and to want to kill a human
being, no matter what "beneficial states of affairs [killing him]
promises,.., is contrary to the charity we are bound to have for
all."6' 1 By contrast, to kill someone with foresight but not intent
is not necessarily to want to kill him; indeed, it may be that one
would rejoice if one's action did not result in killing anyone, even
if it is virtually inevitable that one's action will yield death.62
So, according to John Paul II, as interpreted by Brugger, one
may never kill a human being intentionally: "[T]he intentional
destruction of a person's life" is necessarily a failure of love; it is
necessarily "contrary to the charity we are bound to have for all";
as such, it is necessarily a failure to respect "the inalienable
dignity of human life."63 To respect the inalienable dignity of a
human being-to treat a human being as if he has inherent
dignity, not as if he lacks it-is to treat him lovingly; to fail to
treat him lovingly-to act "contrary to the charity we are bound
to have for all"-is to fail to respect his inherent dignity.
("[W]hereas 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' represents
the Greek of the Septuagint (Leviticus 19:18) and of the New
Testament, the Hebrew from which the former is derived means
rather 'You shall treat your neighbor lovingly, for he is like
yourself."') 64 Because to execute a human being is necessarily to
kill him intentionally, one may never execute a human being.
For government to execute a human being is necessarily for it to
treat him as if he lacks inherent dignity. According to this
"unconditionalist" principle, there are no conditions in which it is
morally permissible to execute a human being-or, more
generally, to kill a human being intentionally. The moral
understood) in the Church's teaching on the death penalty that would at
minimum state that the exigencies of retribution (i.e., of the need to
redress the disorder introduced by the criminal's crime) [do not justify] the
inflicting of capital punishment. That is to say, death as a punishment is
never legitimate.
Id.
60 See supra note 56.
61 BRUGGER, supra note 24, at 173. For a development of the point, see E.
Christian Brugger, Aquinas and Capital Punishment: The Plausibility of the
Traditional Argument, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 357 (2004).
62 See supra note 56.
63 See BRUGGER, supra note 24, at 173, 193.
64 J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 243 (1977).
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impermissibility of such action is unconditional: No matter what
conditions obtain-even if, for example, in a particular society
capital punishment has been shown to have a significant
deterrent effect-to kill a human being intentionally is beyond
the moral pale.
Should we who affirm the morality of human rights accept
the unconditionalist principle that to kill a human being
intentionally-any human being, innocent or not-is always and
everywhere a failure of love and therefore a failure to respect the
inherent dignity of the victim? Whether Brugger is correct in
attributing this principle to John Paul II is not important for
present purposes. My concern here is not with Brugger's
attribution, but with the principle itself.6 5 I want to test the
principle by means of the following three hypotheticals.
Hypothetical #1: I am a human rights activist in a country
in the grip of a brutal dictator. My five-year-old daughter and I
have been kidnapped by a paramilitary squad that is doing the
dictator's bidding. I know that tomorrow morning, as I am
forced to watch, my child will be raped, tortured, and murdered,
and then I will be tortured and murdered. The only way I can
spare my child, who is now sleeping beside me, this horrific fate
65 I do believe, however, that Brugger's attribution is accurate. So, apparently,
do the U.S. Catholic bishops. In November 2000, in a statement titled
"Responsibility, Rehabilitation and Restoration: A Catholic Perspective on Crime
and Criminal Justice," the U.S. Catholic bishops wrote:
We are guided by the paradoxical Catholic teaching on crime and
punishment: We will not tolerate the crime and violence that threaten the
lives and dignity of our sisters and brothers, and we will not give up on
those who have lost their way. We seek both justice and mercy.
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and
Restoration: A Catholic Perspective on Crime and Criminal Justice 22 (2000)
(emphasis added). During Lent of 2004, 45 U.S. Catholic bishops from 12 southern
states issued a statement of their own, in which they declared that:
A Catholic approach never gives up on those who violate laws. We believe
that both victims and offenders are children of God. Despite their very
different claims on society, their lives and dignity should be protected and
respected. We seek justice, not vengeance. We believe punishment must
have clear purposes: protecting society and rehabilitating those who
violate the law.
Southern U.S. Bishops, Toward Restorative, Not Retributive, Criminal Justice, 34
ORIGINS 63 (2004). If Brugger's attribution is correct, and if John Paul II were to
deem this principle "irreformable" or "infallible," cf. BRUGGER, supra note 24, at
141-63, Antonin Scalia would have to resign from the Supreme Court-or so he
says. See Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, 123 FIRST THINGS 17, 17-18 (May
2002); see also Antonin Scalia and His Critics: An Exchange on the Church, the
Courts, and the Death Penalty, 126 FIRST THINGS 8, 9 (October 2002).
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is by killing her tonight, quickly and painlessly. If I choose to
kill her, would I be treating my child as if she lacks inherent
dignity? Of course not. If I choose to kill my daughter, I would
be doing so because she is infinitely precious to me; I love my
daughter more than life itself. To insist that if I choose to kill
my daughter, I would be treating her as if she lacks inherent
dignity is, in a word, ridiculous. Therefore, the claim that to kill
a human being intentionally is necessarily to treat him as if he
lacks inherent dignity-and thereby to violate him-is
implausible. To say that in killing my daughter intentionally I
would not be treating her as if she lacks inherent dignity is not
to say that in choosing not to kill her, I would be treating her as
if she lacks inherent dignity, or even that, all things considered,
I should kill her. It is just to say that in killing her intentionally
so as to spare her the horrible fate that awaits her in the
morning, I would not be treating her as if she lacks inherent
dignity; I would not be violating her.
Hypothetical #1, which is a counterexample to the
unconditionalist claim that to kill a human being intentionally is
necessarily to treat him as if he lacks inherent dignity, may lead
one to revise the claim, so that it now states: To kill a human
being intentionally, not for his own sake but for the sake of
another, is necessarily to treat him as if he lacks inherent
dignity. This revised claim is not only more plausible than the
original claim. (It is one thing to use someone as a means-an
instrument-to an end that is good for someone else; it is another
thing to use someone as a means to an end that is good for them.)
The revised claim is also sufficient to vindicate the position on
the death penalty that Brugger attributes to John Paul II,
because to execute a human being is not to kill him for his own
sake. Should we accept the revised claim? This brings us to the
second hypothetical.
Hypothetical #2: I am the commander of a military force
fighting a just war against the brutal dictator in Hypothetical
#1. It is imperative that we destroy the enemy's principal
munitions factory; if we succeed, the end of the war will be in
sight. I face a choice. A new, more powerful bomb has just been
added to our arsenal; I can order my pilots to drop this bomb on
the factory. However, the dictator has arranged for about 1000
people-mainly the factory workers, most of whom are forced to
work in the factory, and their families-to live in close proximity
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to the factory, so as to deter us from bombing it. I foresee (but do
not intend) that if we drop the bomb on the factory, the bomb
and the secondary explosions will kill virtually all 1000 people,
including the factory manager, his wife, and their children.
Alternatively, I can send a special operations unit to infiltrate
and destroy the factory. I am attracted to this option, even
though it is more risky, because if all goes as planned, as few as
100 of the 1000 people would be killed, whereas under the first
option, virtually all 1000 would be killed. For various reasons,
however, the only plan that stands a realistic chance of
succeeding involves invading the factory manager's home while
he and his family are sleeping, threatening to kill the members
of his family one by one unless he cooperates, and, if necessary,
actually killing a member of his family to demonstrate that the
threat is real. (Pretending to kill a member of his family won't
work.) According to the revised claim, in killing a member of the
factory manager's family intentionally, I would be treating the
victim-his wife, for example-as if she lacks inherent dignity,
because I would not be killing her for her own sake. But is it
plausible to think that in killing her intentionally, I would be
treating her as if she lacks inherent dignity?
It is easy to see that making a person die rather than live so
that you can achieve some goal, however worthy, is using him
as a means to your end. But it is extremely difficult to see how
causing a person to die by one means rather than causing him
to die by another, in cases where it is permissible to cause the
death by the first means ... is using him as a means, or failing
to respect him as an end. 66
After reflection, I choose the second option; I choose, that is,
intentionally causing the death of a member of the factory
manager's family rather than merely foreseeably causing it, in a
context in which (1) the foreseeably-killing-her option is morally
legitimate, (2) she is going to die-she is going to be killed-no
matter which of the two options I choose, and (3) the
intentionally-killing-her option is significantly better than the
foreseeably-killing-her option in terms of minimizing the loss of
human life.
66 DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION 223 (2003) (emphasis added).
Hypothetical #2 was inspired by a hypothetical in Boonin's book. See id. at 222-27.
[Vol.44:1
2005] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 23
While [the great Christian ethicist Paul Ramsey] was
committed to an absolute prohibition against murder as the
intentional killing of innocent life, he was prepared to attach
two exempting conditions to it. One may directly kill when (1)
the innocent will die in any case and (2) other innocent life will
be saved.67
This second hypothetical-which, like the first one, is a
counterexample to the claim that to kill a human being
intentionally is necessarily to treat him as if he lacks inherent
dignity-may, like the first one, lead one to further revise the
claim, so that it now states: To kill a human being intentionally,
not for his own sake but for the sake of another, in a context
other than one in which he is going to be killed no matter which
option is chosen and the intentionally-killing-him option is
significantly better than the foreseeably-killing-him option in
terms of achieving a morally legitimate objective, is necessarily to
treat him as if he lacks inherent dignity. This further revised
claim is not only more plausible than the original claim; it is also
sufficient to vindicate the position on the death penalty that
Brugger attributes to John Paul II: To execute a human being is
not to choose intentionally-killing-him over foreseeably-killing-
him in a context in which he is going to be killed no matter
which option is chosen. Should we accept the further revised
claim? This brings us to the third and final hypothetical.
Hypothetical #3: I am the President of the United States. I
have just been informed that a group of terrorists has planted a
nuclear bomb in the middle of New York City, and only they
know where the bomb is located. The bomb will explode in two
hours, killing millions of people, unless I (through those who will
obey my orders) kill, within the next hour, someone, X, in the
protective custody of the United States whom the terrorists
desperately want dead. (X is being held in a secret location
thousands of miles from New York City.) There is no way to fool
the terrorists, and every reason to believe that they will keep
their word. According to the further revised claim, in acceding to
the terrorists' demand, I would be treating X as if he lacks
inherent dignity, because I would neither be killing X for his own
sake nor choosing intentionally-killing-X over foreseeably-
67 Gene Outka, The Ethics of Human Stem Cell Research, in GOD AND THE
EMBRYO: RELIGIOUS VOICES ON STEM CELLS AND CLONING 29, 46 (Brent Waters &
Ronald Cole-Turner eds., 2003) (footnote omitted).
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killing-X in a context in which X is going to be killed no matter
which option is chosen. But is it plausible to think that in
acceding to the terrorists' demand, I would be treating X as if he
lacks inherent dignity?
Now we have arrived at the heart of the matter. Let's
assume that in the pursuit of a particular objective-saving the
lives of millions of people, for example-Y may, if necessary, act
in such a way that he foreseeably (but not intentionally) kills Z.
That is, let's assume that in doing so, Y does not treat Z as if Z
lacks inherent dignity. Now, a different scenario: If Y is to
achieve the same objective, Y must kill Z intentionally. Why
should we believe that in the second scenario, but not in the
first, Y, in killing Z, would be treating Z as if Z lacks inherent
dignity? The only possibly relevant difference I can discern is
this: In the first scenario, in which Y foreseeably (but not
intentionally) kills Z, Y does not want to kill Z, whereas in the
second scenario, in which Y intentionally kills Z, Y necessarily
wants to kill Z (because, again, to intend to bring about a state of
affairs is necessarily to want to bring it about). But why should
this difference, in and of itself, be determinative? After all, (1) Y
wants to achieve the same compelling objective in each scenario,
and it is no less true in the second scenario than in the first that
(2) if Y chooses to act to achieve the objective, Y's act kills Z and
(3) Y does not desire Z's death as an end in itself but only
because the objective cannot be achieved without killing Z;
indeed, Y passionately desires that the objective could be
achieved without Z's having to die. 68 Recall John Paul II's claim,
per Brugger, that intentionally killing a human being, no matter
what "beneficial states of affairs it promises, is in itself wrong,
because, as the intentional destruction of a person's life, it is
contrary to the charity we are bound to have for all."69 It is far
from clear, however, why in the second scenario, but not in the
first, for Y to kill Z in the course of acting to achieve the objective
would be for Y to act "contrary to the charity that we are bound
to have for all"-why it would be for Y to treat Z as if Z lacks
inherent dignity. Y is caught in the unbreakable grip of a tragic
conflict; he has an opportunity to prevent a disaster of truly
68 See H. David Baer, Proportionalism Defended, 143 FIRST THINGS 3, 4 (May
1994).
69 BRUGGER, supra note 24, at 173; see also supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
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catastrophic-even holocaustal-proportions. To insist that in
the second scenario, but not in the first, we know that for Y to
kill Z is necessarily for Y to treat Z as if Z lacks inherent dignity
is implausible. What if Y would choose to kill Z even if Z were
someone Y loves dearly? What if Y would readily kill himself
rather than Z if doing so would achieve the objective?
Because it yields counterintuitive results in some
imaginable cases, the unconditionalist principle-that there are
no conditions in which it is morally permissible to execute a
human being, or, more generally, to kill a human being
intentionally-is, at best, a problematic basis for arguing that
the law should protect the right of every human being not to be
executed. 70 Though less so, each of the two principles I've
articulated in this section as more plausible alternatives to the
unconditionalist principle is still problematic. 71
III. INHERENT DIGNITY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
"CONDITIONALIsT" APPROACH
One may want to argue that in punishing a convicted
criminal, government is acting partly for the criminal's own
sake-treating him as a responsible, accountable human being
70 According to Charles Fried, "[W]e can imagine extreme cases where killing
an innocent person may save a whole nation. In such cases it seems fanatical to
maintain the absoluteness of the judgment, to do right even if the heavens will in
fact fall." CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 10 (1978). By contrast, John Finnis
has written:
There are hard cases, as everybody knows. The prospect.. . of damage
apparently avertable by violating the moral absolute, can seem indubitable
and be felt as overwhelming. But these are cases in which we do not see
the relevant parts of the scheme of providence-a scheme of which we
never, in this life, see the whole or even much.... To deny the truth of
moral absolutes... is incoherent with faith in divine providence.... [T]o
respect the moral absolutes which are made known to us by God through
reason and faith is to cooperate with God, who has practical knowledge of
everything without limit.
JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 12, 20 (1991).
Those of us who cannot accept Finnis' theology of providence will likely side with
Fried in this dispute.
71 Alternative #1: To kill a human being intentionally not for his own sake but
for the sake of someone else is always to violate him. Alternative #2: To kill a human
being intentionally not for his own sake but for the sake of someone else, in a
context other than one in which he is going to be killed no matter which option is
chosen and the intentionally-killing-him option is significantly better than the
foreseeably-killing-him option in terms of achieving a morally legitimate objective, is
always to violate him.
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and also trying to rehabilitate him. (Of course, depending on
prison conditions, etc., government may not really be trying, or
trying very hard, to rehabilitate.) But in punishing a convicted
criminal by killing him, government is not acting even partly for
the criminal's own sake. 72  Nor is government choosing
intentionally-killing-him over foreseeably-killing-him in a
context in which the criminal will be killed no matter which
option is chosen. Nor is executing a convicted criminal necessary
to prevent a catastrophe, like the deaths of millions of people.
What, then, if anything, justifies maintaining a system-even a
perfectly functioning system-of capital punishment? What, if
anything, justifies executing human beings? To maintain a
system of capital punishment without a sufficiently weighty
justification for doing so is to treat those who are killed under
the system as if they lack inherent dignity, as if they are what
Thomas Aquinas believed some criminals to be: "fall[en] away
from human dignity, ... fall[en] somehow into the slavery of the
beasts, so that [they] may be disposed of according to what is
useful to others."73 Is there a sufficiently weighty justification
for maintaining a system of capital punishment?
According to the Catholic Church, no modern society need
execute a convicted criminal in order to protect itself from him;
section 2267 of the 1997 Catechism of the Catholic Church
states, in relevant part:
Today .... as a consequence of the possibilities which the state
has for effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has
committed an offense incapable of doing harm-without
definitively taking away from him the possibility of redeeming
72 Even if it happens to be the case that the criminal wants to die, that is not
why government is executing him.
Jeffrie Murphy called to my attention, in discussion, the (Kantian?) argument
that one respects the human being by giving him the punishment he deserves-and
disrespects him by failing to do so. If Jack deserves the death penalty, therefore, one
respects Jack by giving it to him-and disrespects Jack by failing to do so. But, of
course, the question is whether Jack or anyone does deserve the death penalty. To
argue that in punishing a convicted criminal by killing him, government is acting
partly for the criminal's own sake-government is respecting him by giving him the
punishment he deserves-is to beg the question: Does anyone "deserve" the death
penalty?
73 See BRUGGER, supra note 24, at 173 (quoting Aquinas); see also Brugger,
Aquinas and Capital Punishment: The Plausibility of the Traditional Argument,
supra note 60, at 365-66.
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himself-the cases in which the execution of the offender is an
absolute necessity "are ... practically non-existent. '74
The Church's position on this point seems right. But, still, even
a modern society may need to execute some convicted criminals
in order to protect itself, not from those criminals, but from some
other criminals, or from some would-be criminals. That is,
capital punishment might have a deterrent effect; at least, it
might have a deterrent effect in some societies.
And, indeed, recent economic studies indicate that in the
United States, capital punishment does have a deterrent effect.75
In one study, for example, the three co-authors--one of whom is
my Emory colleague, economist Joanna Shepherd-conclude
"that capital punishment has a strong deterrent effect; each
execution results, on average, in 18 fewer murders-with a
margin of error of plus or minus 10. Tests show that results are
not driven by tougher sentencing laws, and are also robust to
many alternative specifications." 76  Now, I am not competent
either to vouch for or to challenge the conclusion that Professor
Shepherd and her colleagues have reached. I do want to
emphasize that it remains a matter of great controversy not only
whether capital punishment in the United States has a deterrent
effect, 77 but also whether, given the limited data available, we
can know whether it does. 8 And, indeed, in a more recent paper,
Professor Shepherd reaches a more nuanced conclusion: that in
the United States, "[e]xecutions deter murders in six states and
have no effect on murders in eight states. In thirteen states,
executions increase murders-what I call the 'brutalization
74 See BRUGGER, supra note 24, at 9-37 (quoting JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL
LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE (1995)).
75 For a compilation of recent studies, along with abstracts, see Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation, Articles on Death Penalty Deterrence, at http://www.cjlf.
org/deathpenalty/DPDeterrence.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
76 The quoted language is from the abstract of the article: Hashem Dezhbakhsh
et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from
Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003).
77 See, e.g., Rudolph J. Gerber, Economic and Historical Implications for
Capital Punishment Deterrence, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 437,
437-38 (2004).
78 See Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence:
Deja Vu All Over Again?, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming), available at
http://preprints.stats.ucla.edu/396/JELS.pap.pdf. Richard Berk is a professor in the
UCLA Department of Statistics.
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effect."' 79 Nonetheless, I will assume, for the sake of discussion,
that capital punishment in the United States has a deterrent
effect of the magnitude that Professor Shepherd and her
colleagues suggest, because this assumption brings to the fore a
fundamental question about the legitimacy of capital
punishment. There is surely no more compelling warrant for
maintaining a system of capital punishment than the system's
deterrent effect: If a deterrent effect of the magnitude that
Professor Sheperd and her co-authors suggest-if keeping 18
people (plus or minus ten) from being murdered-does not
warrant maintaining a system of capital punishment, then
nothing (other than, perhaps, a much larger deterrent effect) can
warrant maintaining a system of capital punishment. Does a
deterrent effect of that magnitude warrant maintaining a system
of capital punishment?
I don't know how to go about answering that question-
except indirectly. Consider, then, these three questions:
1) In Hypothetical #3, would saving the lives not of
millions of people but of 18 hostages warrant the
president's killing X?
2) If a system of torture-plus-capital-punishment would
deter 36 murders per execution-twice the number that,
according to Professor Shepherd and her co-authors,
79 Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment's
Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript
at 1, on file with author) (emphasis omitted).
In general, the states that have executed more than nine people in the last
twenty years experience deterrence. In states that have not reached this
threshold, executions generally increase murders or have no significant
impact. On average across the U.S., executions deter crime because the
states with deterrence execute many more people than do the states
without it. The results of this paper help to explain the contrasting
conclusions of earlier papers: whether deterrence exists depends on which
states are examined. My results have three important policy implications.
First, if deterrence is the objective, then capital punishment generally
succeeds in the few states with many executions. Second, the many states
with numbers of executions below the threshold may be executing people
needlessly. Indeed, instead of deterring crime, the executions may be
inducing additional murders: a rough total estimate is that, in the many
states where executions induce murders rather than deter them,
executions cause an additional 250 murders per year. Third, to achieve
deterrence, states must generally execute many people. If a state is
unwilling to establish such a large execution program, it should consider
abandoning capital punishment.
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capital punishment alone deters per execution-would
that warrant establishing a system of torture-plus-capital
punishment?8 0
3) Does a deterrent effect of the magnitude that Professor
Sheperd and her co-authors suggest warrant maintaining
a system of capital punishment?
There is no algorithm-at least, I know of none-for determining
what number of savable lives is large enough to warrant the
intentional killing of a human being, but if we answer, or are
inclined to answer, "No" to the first two questions just posed,
why wouldn't we answer, or be inclined to answer, "No" to the
third question as well? In June 2001, at an international
conference on the death penalty, the Holy See of the Catholic
Church stated that "[i]t is surely more necessary than ever that
the inalienable dignity of human life be universally respected
and recognized for its immeasurable value."81  If one answers
"No" to the first two questions and "Yes" to the third, is it
plausible to claim that one recognizes "for its immeasurable
value," and respects, "the inalienable dignity" of those who will
be executed under a system of capital punishment?
The United States Congress has authorized, at least partly
for deterrent purposes, the execution of some convicted criminals
even as it declines to make other choices that would save lives--
the choice, for example, to impose stricter automobile safety
regulations, which would save the lives of tens of thousands of
people. Is it plausible, then, to claim that the Congress is
treating those who will be executed as if they possess "the
inalienable dignity" of which the Holy See, following the lead of
John Paul II, speaks? We can ask much the same question about
any state legislature that maintains a system of capital
punishment even as it declines to make other life-saving
choices-for example, to ban secondhand smoke in public places,
which research suggests would save many lives.8 2
80 See Henry Schwarzschild, Reflections on Capital Punishment, 25 ISRAEL L.
REV. 505, 508 (1991).
81 BRUGGER, supra note 24, at 191-92 (citation omitted).
82 See Sanjay Gupta, A Montana Ordinance Has a Surprising Effect-and
Triggers a CDC Warning, TIME, May 10, 2004, at 82 (reporting that the Centers for
Disease Control estimate that in the United States, "secondhand smoke causes
35,000 deaths a year from heart disease-a figure some experts believe will have to
be revised upward").
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Again, there is no algorithm for determining what number of
savable lives is large enough to warrant the intentional killing of
a human being. There is, however, a crucial question-a
counterfactual question-for anyone who affirms that every
human being has inherent dignity and who must decide whether
intentionally to kill one human being, A, or whether to authorize
someone else to kill A, in order to save the lives of a number of
others: "If someone I love dearly-my child, for example-were
in the position that A is in, would I want my child to be killed in
order to save those lives?" (A may be a convicted murderer
under a sentence of death, for example, or A may be the person
that the terrorists in Hypothetical #3 want the president of the
United States to kill.) If the answer is "No," it seems fair to
suspect that intentionally killing A would be a failure of love, but
if the answer is "Yes," it seems doubtful that intentionally killing
A would be a failure of love, that it would treat A as if he lacks
inherent dignity. Of course, to allow that intentionally killing A
would not be a failure of love, that it would not treat A as if he
lacks inherent dignity, is not to deny that killing A would be, all
things considered, tragic-even, perhaps, tragically misguided.
Those who affirm the morality of human rights and accept
the unconditionalist principle that to kill someone intentionally
is necessarily to treat him as if he lacks inherent dignity and
thereby to violate him, have reason to want the law to protect
the right not to be executed. As do those who affirm the morality
of human rights and accept either of the two alternative
principles I articulated in the preceding section.83 But, again,
some of us who affirm the morality of human rights can accept
neither the unconditionalist principle nor either of the two
alternatives. What reason do we who fit that profile have for
wanting the law to protect the right not to be executed?
Earlier, I asked whether subjecting a human being to capital
punishment, even under a perfectly functioning system of capital
punishment, is necessarily to treat him as if he lacks inherent
dignity and thereby to violate him. "Necessarily" is a strong
word. Assume-though it may strain credulity to do so-that
the policymakers who choose to maintain, rather than to abolish,
83 See supra Section II.
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a system of capital punishment do so because, even though they
sincerely believe that even the most depraved criminal has
inherent dignity, they also sincerely believe that system's
deterrent effect is great enough to warrant maintaining the
system. Shouldn't we then conclude that the policymakers-
even if their sincere belief that the system's deterrent effect is
great enough to warrant maintaining the system is, by our
lights, wrong-are not treating those who will be executed under
the system as if they lack inherent dignity-and, therefore, are
not violating them?
But what practical difference should it make if the
policymakers are not violating those who are executed under the
system? None that I can see. As I explained earlier in this
essay, we who affirm the morality of human rights should want
the law to ban not only actions/policies that violate human
beings, by denying that they have, or by otherwise treating them
as if they lack, inherent dignity. We should also want the law to
ban actions/policies that, even if they do not violate human
beings, are nonetheless a source of unwarranted human
suffering (or other harm). Again, if we decline to do what we
can, all things considered, to diminish unwarranted human
suffering, we decline to do what we can, all things considered, to
protect those who endure that suffering. We thereby fail to
respect their inherent dignity; we violate them by treating them
as if they lack inherent dignity. As I noted earlier, sometimes it
is not, or not only, a misbegotten government action/policy that
violates human beings; sometimes the violation consists in our
collective failure to do what we can, all things considered, to
protect human beings from the action/policy.
Again, to say that the suffering of human beings is
"unwarranted" is to say that the action/policy that causes the
suffering, or that fails to intervene to diminish it, is not
warranted, that it is not justified, from the perspective of those
of us who, in confronting the suffering, must decide what, if
anything, to do, or to try to do, about it; in making that decision,
we must reach our own judgment about whether the
action/policy that is the immediate cause of the suffering-here,
a system, any system, of capital punishment-is warranted.
Therefore, if we-we who affirm the radical, outlandish,
subversive teaching that every human being, even the most
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depraved criminal, has inherent dignityS4-conclude that no
system of capital punishment is warranted, is justified, by its
deterrent effect (if it has a deterrent effect), we should affirm the
trajectory marked by the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
(1989) and Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention (2002).
We should want the law to protect the right not to be executed.
Of course, if we conclude-contrary to what we've been assuming
here for the sake of discussion-that capital punishment has no
(or no significant) deterrent effect, we have that reason for
wanting the law to ban capital punishment.
Another reason for opposing capital punishment merits
mention here: Contrary to what we have been assuming in this
chapter, it is difficult to see how systems of capital punishment,
which do not function even close to perfectly, can be made-
reformed-to do so.
The differences that exist between rich and poor, between good
and bad prosecutions, between good and bad defense, between
severe and lenient judges, between judges who favour capital
punishment and those who do not, and the subjective attitudes
that might be brought into play by factors such as race and
class, may... affect any case that comes before the courts, and
is almost certainly present to some degree in all court
systems.... Imperfection inherent in criminal trials means
that error cannot be excluded; it also means that persons
similarly placed may not necessarily receive similar
punishment.8 5
This is a weighty reason to be concerned about the justice of
relying on capital punishment, even if we assume for the sake of
discussion that the death penalty has, or may have, some
deterrent effect.86
84 Cf. GRAHAM GREENE, THE POWER AND THE GLORY 169-70 (1940).
When you visualized a man or a woman carefully, you could always begin
to feel pity ... [W]hen you saw the lines at the corners of the eyes, the
shape of the mouth, how the hair grew, it was impossible to hate. Hate was
just a failure of imagination.
Id.
85 This statement was made in 1995 by the president of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of South Africa. State v. Makwanyane, Constitutional Court of
the Republic of South Africa, 1995, Case No.CCT/3/94, [1995] 1 LRC 269.
86 See Marshall, supra note 36, at 576.
A new group of abolitionists is emerging. These new abolitionists are not
particularly interested in the philosophical, theoretical, or theological
debate about the propriety of capital punishment. Rather, they have
concluded that regardless of whether one believes that the government has
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the right to take life as an abstract matter, one cannot support the death
penalty given the practical issues surrounding the unfairness and
inaccuracy of its implementation.
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